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The Juvenile Court - A Court
of Law
Walter G. Whitlatch
The juvenile court, as a court of law, has often come under attack
on procedural and constitutional grounds. After stating that these attacks are probably due to a lack of public understanding of the court,
the author explains why they are unjustified. He also traces the growth
and development of the juvenile court, emphasizing the juvenile court of
Ohio, and concludes that the court represents a growth in legal theory
rather than a departuretherefrom.

N THE NEARLY seventy years of its existence as part of the
judicial system of the United States, the juvenile court has successfully withstood many vigorous and sometimes virulent attacks
on its concept, philosophy, procedure, and constitutionality.1 These
attacks have been predicated on
the
of the
juvenile
Tus AUTHOR is a Judge of the Juvenile
courtalleged
law tofailure
provide
conCourt of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.

stitutional guarantees of criminal law, for example, trial by
jury, bail, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right
to counsel.
Such attacks were to be expected when the court first came into
existence. The doctrine of parens patriae was quite old, but here
for the first time it was expressed in the establishment of a specialized court, and although originated by lawyers and judges who knew
the inadequacies and the harshness of the criminal statutes when
dealing with children, the practicing lawyer accepted the court only
reluctantly after repeatedly challenging its constitutionality.2 The
bar, with only infrequent appearances in the juvenile court and having learned nothing of its procedures in law school, was shocked to
learn that criminal procedures were not followed. This discovery
1

Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (see citations upholding
constitutionality therein); Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965),
cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 498 (1966); Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964); In re Darnell, 174 Ohio St. 335, 182 N.E.2d 321 (1962); State v.
Shardell, 107 Ohio App. 338, 153 N.E.2d 510 (1958).
2
See, e.g., Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (S.D. Ohio 1911); In re Daedler,
194 Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 Ad. 678 (1923);
In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 196 Pac. 563 (1908); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 IM. 328, 100
N.. 892 (1913); Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682
(1908); State ex rel. Alatacia v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359, 254 S.W. 179 (1923); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Ad. 198 (1905).

1240

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18: 1239

should have occasioned no surprise, since the purpose of the juvenile
court was to free the child from antiquated procedures in the hostile,
punitive atmosphere of the criminal court. As Mr. Justice Holmes
has reportedly stated "they [judges and lawyers] are more likely to
hate at sight any analysis to which they are not accustomed and
which disturbs repose of mind, than to fall in love with novelties."3
Perhaps the most apt description of the juvenile court concept is
that given in the report of the Chicago Bar Committee which, in
1899, drafted the first juvenile court law known to the world:
The fundamental idea ...is that the State must step in and
exercise guardianship over a child found under such adverse social
or individual conditions as develop crime.... It proposes a plan
whereby he may be treated not as a criminal, or legally charged
with a crime, but as a ward of the state, to receive practically the
care, custody and discipline that are accorded the neglected and
dependent child, and which, as the Act states, "shall approximate
as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents."4
As pointed out by one author,5 "the juvenile court should be
looked upon as a growth in legal theory and not as a departure
therefrom."' It will thus be the purpose of this article to trace the
growth and development of the legal theory that forms the basis
for the juvenile court which functions today as an integral part of
the administration of justice and as a modern court of law. While,
as might be expected, this development has not been uniform
throughout the United States - with the various legislatures reacting and over-reacting to criticism of this relatively new judicial
structure - there has been a steady growth in the direction of protecting the statutory and constitutional rights of those brought before the court. In the past several years, both California and New
York' have adopted new codes which attempt to provide a practical
balance between civil due process for the child and the informal
court proceeding which minimizes the harmful effects of an adver3

Address by Kenneth D. Johnson, Dean, New York School of Social Work, Columbia University, Fiftieth Anniversary of the Juvenile Court of Cuyahoga County,
Cleveland, Ohio, May 22, 1952, in EASTMAN & McDEamoTr, CUYAHOGA CotrTY
JUVENILE COURT FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1952, 10 (1953).
4 Report of the Chicago Bar Committee, as quoted in 2 JUVENILE CT. JUDGES J. 10
(1960).
5LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1927). This text is valuable
for its presentation of the early history and philosophy of the juvenile court.
6Id. at 3. (Emphasis added.)
7 CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §5 500-914. For a discussion of the California
changes, see Selected 1960-61 CaliforniaLegislation, 36 J.S.B. CAL. 643, 862 (1961).
8N.Y.

JUDIaARY LAW §§711-84.
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sary proceeding and encourages the child's receptivity to treatment.
The most common point of reference in this article, however, will
be the juvenile court of Ohio, where there has been an intelligent
growth and development of the law, a situation not untypical of
other states.
I.

JUVENILE COURT BACKGROUND AND
DEVELOPMENT

A.

In General

While the juvenile court is a comparatively modern juridical
concept, the legal principles underlying it stem from the ancient
common law doctrine of parens patriae, under which the king reposed the protection of the kingdom's infants in his chancellor, the
keeper of his conscience.' Thus, the juvenile court is the legal embodiment of a common law doctrine in the form of a special court,
coupled with modern methods of discharging the state's power as
the ultimate parent of the child.
Modern juvenile court law extends and refines the common law
principle that children under seven years of age are incapable of
formulating criminal intent and that children from seven to fourteen are rebuttably presumed to be incapable of formulating such
intent.Y While the juvenile court law in Ohio extends the presumption of inability to formulate criminal intent to age eighteen,"x
the court may determine that any child who has committed an act
which would be a felony if committed by an adult should be tried as
an adult, the case then being certified to the court of common pleas."2
In effect, then, this certification removes the presumption of the
child's inability to formulate a criminal intent. Today, after a sodological and juristic reformation which began throughout the civilized world a century ago, the concept is that a child who has violated the law is not a criminal,' 3 but rather he is to be taken in hand
by the state as protector and ultimate guardian rather than as his
enemy. 14

9103 BLACKSTONB,

CoM ENTuuRs *426-28.
There is a common law presumption of criminal incapacity below the age of
fourteen which is conclusive prior to age seven and rebuttable thereafter. PmulNS,
CRRMNAL LAW 731 (1957).
"1 Statutory provisions have limited the criminal capacity to those above seventeen
or eighteen. Id. at 733. In Ohio, a "child" is one who has not reached eighteen years
of age. OHIo REv. CODE § 2151.01.
' 2 Omuo REV. CoDE § 2151.26.
13
See Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964).
1
4 See MAcIK, THE JUVENIIE COuRT (1909); 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909).
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Ohio's law is neither criminal nor penal in nature; rather, it is
an administrative police regulation of a corrective character." In
the exercise of its power of parens patriae, the legislature has established the juvenile court and delegated to it certain powers to discharge the state's guardianship over minor children."
Long before the juvenile court evolved in its present form, however, state legislatures found it necessary to recognize the difference
in the treatment of children and adults with respect to restraint of
liberty and confinement.'
The same issues being raised now in attacking the juvenile court were raised, argued, and disposed of in
connection with these early legislative enactments. 8
B.

The Constitutional and Procedural "Problems"

(1) In General.-The earliest case specifically dealing with
the constitutional rights of what is now called a juvenile delinquent
is Ex parte Crouse,'9 decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in 1839. There it was said: "As abridgment of indefeasible rights
by confinement of the person, it is no more than what is borne, to
a greater or less extent, in every school; and we know of no natural
right to exemption from restraints which conduce to an infant's welfare."2
Similar decisions were in abundance before the juvenile
courts as such came into existence.2'
15 Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (S.D. Ohio 1911); Gerak v. State, 22 Ohio
App. 357, 153 N.E. 902 (1920); State ex rel. Fortini v. Hoffman, 12 Ohio App. 341
(1920); Leonard v. Licker, 3 Ohio App. 377 (1914); State v. Joiner, 20 Ohio NY. (n.s.)
313 (C.P. 1917); ls re James L____, Jr., 194 N.E.2d 797 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1963).
16 State v. Miclau, 104 Ohio App. 347, 140 N.E.2d 596, afld, 167 Ohio St. 38, 146
N.E.2d 293 (1957); In the Matter of Viselich, 22 Ohio App. 528, 154 N.E. 55 (1926);
Bleier v. Crouse, 13 Ohio App. 69 (1920).
17 See Lou, op. cit. supra note 5, at 15-19.
IsId. at 13-25.
'9 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839).
20Id. at 11.

In the Matter of Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 371 (1882):
We perceive hardly any more restraint of liberty than is found in any well
regulated school. Such a degree of restraint is essential in the proper education of a child, and it is in no just sense an infringement of the inherent and
inalienable right to personal liberty so much dwelt upon in the argument.
See also Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 472 (1883):
[T1he boy is not proceeded against as a criminal. Nor is confinement in the
State Reform School a punishment, nor in any proper sense imprisonment.
It is in the nature of a parental restraint. It is a mode of education to usefulness; compulsory, but not for that reason improper; and the restraint is a
necessary incident of the compulsory education. It is all made necessary by the
corrupting influences that surrounded and are likely to control the boy, and by
the need of society for protection, and that necessity justifies the proceeding.
To make the restraint and instruction of any permanent value they must be
21
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Despite these decisions, however, it was recognized before the
end of the nineteenth century that the problem might not remain
settled:
The question of the extent to which the state may assume the
guardianship of children who have committed no offense is one
which has never proved a very difficult one practically because of
the limited efforts of the Legislature in that direction; but the
question goes to the very depths of the subject of civil government,
and may grow more difficult as the necessity of saving the young
from evil lives becomes more pressing or apparent2 2
The creation of the juvenile court was recognition that the
limited efforts of legislatures of the nineteenth century were not
sufficient and such laws must be extended because the necessity of
saving the young from evil lives did become more pressing and apparent." "Juveniles have particular and peculiar rights and they
require particular and peculiar treatment. The basic right of a
juvenile is not to liberty but to custody. He has the right to have
someone take care of him, and if his parents do not afford him this
custodial privilege, the law must do so."24
(2) Ohio.-An early effort by the Ohio legislature to provide
special treatment for children who violated criminal statutes was
the enactment of a statute in 18572" providing that if a child under
the age of sixteen years was charged with a crime, and there appeared to be evidence to support the charge, the grand jury could
in its discretion make a return to the court directing that the child
be committed to a house of refuge. This statute was attacked on
constitutional grounds in 1869, the plaintiff in error contending
that the commitment to the house of refuge deprived him of due
process of law in derogation of the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution; of trial by jury in contravention of article 1,
section 5 of the Ohio Constitution; and of the right to appear, defend, and have a trial by jury contrary to article 1, section 10 of
the Ohio Constitution. 6 The Supreme Court of Ohio, although
continued for a long time. Habits are not changed in a month; not often in
a year. This is specially true of bad habits. The attempt to reform viciously
inclined boys would be an utter failure if limited to a few months. Id. at 478.
Cf. Milwaukee
Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee Co., 40 Wis. 328 (1876).
22
Rich, State Guardianshipof Children, 15 L.R.A. 593 (1893).
23 bid.
24 Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A.J. 719, 720
(1962). (Emphasis added.)
25 1857 Ohio Laws 163. State v. Worden, 162 Ohio St. 593, 124 N.E.2d 817 (1955)
held that this statute was repealed by implication upon the enactment of the Juvenile
Code
in 1937. See 117 Ohio Laws 268.
26
Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184 (1869).
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taking notice that the statute made no provision for a defense nor
for notice of the pendency of the proceedings and that it was an ex
parte proceeding, nevertheless took the position that this proceeding
was not criminal in nature and therefore the constitutional rights asserted by the plaintiff in error had no application." Said the court:
"The proceeding is purely statutory; and the commitment, in cases
like the present, is not designed as a punishment for crime, but to
place minors ...under the guardianship of the public authorities
named, for proper care and discipline .... ""
While this is an instance of the state exercising its authority of
patens patriae long before the establishment of the juvenile court,
the reasoning and the very language of the court is quite similar to
that of the Ohio Supreme Court in 1964," holding that commitment of a minor to the reformatory without an indictment or jury
trial pursuant to section 2151.35 of the Ohio Revised Code was not
violative of the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution or of article 1, section 10 of the Ohio Constituion."0
The significant procedural differences in the two cases well exemplify the growth and development of the law in the interest of
the child. The law now provides that the child must have a hearing;"' that his parents must have notice of the hearing;"2 that such
notice is jurisdictional;"3 and that the child has the right of counsel 4
and the right of appeal.35 In the determination of his needs, the
child now has the benefit of an investigation by a probation officer 6 and of clinical examinations"7 - all in an effort to determine
what course of action is in his best interest.
These statutory provisions did not come about overnight, however. Actually, it was in 1937 that Ohio first adopted the standard
27 Id. at 188.
28 Ibid.
29 Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 NE.2d 457 (1964).
30 Id. at 478, 196 N.E.2d at 459.
31 OHio REV. CODE § 2151.35.
82OnMo REV. CODE § 2151.28.
83 State ex rel. Clark v. Allaman, 154
Frinzl, 152 Ohio St. 164, 87 N.E.2d 583
N.E.2d 892 (1945).
34
Omo REv. CODE § 2151.35 (Supp.
35
OHIo REV. CODE § 2501.02 (Supp.
36
Ozuo REV. CODE § 2151.14.
37
OmIo REV. CODE § 2151.53.

Ohio St. 296, 95 NXE.2d 753 (1950); In re
(1949); In re Corey, 145 Ohio St.413, 61
1966).
1966).
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Juvenile Court Act.38 This act was drawn under the auspices of the
National Probation Association (now the National Council on Delinquency and Crime), by a committee of judges, lawyers, and social
workers. With the exception of several important modifications,
the act remains today essentially unchanged. In the thirty years
since its enactment, the "Juvenile Code" has frequently come under
the critical scrutiny of the legislature. It has not always "found it
good," but generally in close collaboration with the Ohio Association of Juvenile Court judges, the legislature has made salutary
amendments aimed at protecting the legal rights of the children
and parents who come under the court's jurisdiction.
One of the first important modifications mentioned briefly
above was the provision that parents must receive notice of hearing
before any temporary order depriving them of custody of children
was made permanent." In 1955, the legislature specifically provided that the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review upon questions of law "the finding, order or judgment of a juvenile court
that a child is delinquent, neglected or dependent."4
In 1957,
with the objective being to definitely establish the legal rights of
persons before the juvenile court, the legislature provided that a
child had the right to counsel and that any report concerning a child
used in the hearing should be made available to counsel upon a
showing of good cause and a request in writing therefor.4 '
The specific provision for appeal was unnecessary since judgments of the juvenile court were already covered by the general
provisions relating to courts of record inferior to the Ohio courts of
appeals.
Special provision as to the right of the child to counsel
was likewise unnecessary. Although the provisions of the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution and of article I, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution have no application because a delinquency proceeding is a civil and not a criminal action,48 the right
to counsel is guaranteed by the "due process" clause of both the
United States and the Ohio Constitutions.44 Hence, no statutory
38 117 Ohio Laws 268.
39 OHmo REV. CODE § 2151.28.
40
OHIO REV. CODE § 2501.02 (Supp. 1966).
41
OHIo REV. CODE 5 2151.35 (Supp. 1966).
42
Omo REv. CODE 5 2501.02 (Supp. 1966).
43
Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964); State v. Shardell,
107 Ohio App. 338, 153 N.E.2d 510 (1958). But cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.

541 (1966).
4 US.CoNsT. amend. XIV; OHIO CoNsr. art. I, § 16.
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provision was necessary to grant the right of counsel in a delinquency case. Both these amendments as to appeal and right to
counsel were thus an expression of the wariness of lawyers in the
legislature toward the juvenile court. Nevertheless, while unneeded, these amendments served a very useful purpose in helping
to remove the uneasy feeling that many lawyers possessed because
of their unfamiliarity with the court.
The amendment which permits counsel to inspect the social
workers' records used in the hearing 45 has likewise had a mollifying
effect on the attitude of lawyers toward the juvenile court. It is
within this writer's knowledge that, prior to the amendment, it was
argued that to permit the lawyer to see these reports would be completely destructive of the entire juvenile court process. Those who
opposed disclosure claimed that such procedure would destroy the
confidential relationship of court worker and client; would be disruptive of family relationships, since one member of a family would
learn what another member had said concerning him or her; and
would completely dry up sources of information.
None of these dire predictions have materialized. Actually,
now that the statutory right is available, it is a rarity when the lawyer asks to see the record. When he does exercise the right, he
finds that it is not so full of hearsay and gossip as he so fearfully
suspected and that his perusal of it adds little information that he
could not have obtained upon his own inquiry. It is also evident
that such a disclosure has not had the feared results. With a word
of caution from the court, the lawyer can be depended upon not to
disclose information to the family or others that might be disruptive of family relationships. Giving the lawyer the right to inspect
the social records has had an ameliorating effect on the uneasy partnership of the law and social work that constitutes the juvenile
court. Indeed, even without the lawyer's request, it is sometimes
most helpful to the judge to have the lawyer examine the clinical reports so that he may share with the judge the heavy responsibility
of providing the care recommended by the psychologist and the
psychiatrist.
Another attack upon the court involves the hearing process,
which, by Ohio law, is informal.4" As was said in State v. Shardel: 4"
45 OHIo REv. CODE

§ 2151.35 (Supp. 1966).

46 Ibid.
47 107 Ohio App. 338, 153 N.E.2d 510 (1958).
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This [the hearing process] is obviously to do away with the usual
and customary ceremony and procedure of a court trial in order
to surround the child with an atmosphere of friendliness and good
will rather than one of hostility and faultfinding. It is thus proper
for the judge to carry on a conversational type of investigation
which is more conducive to eliciting the truth and arriving at an
impartial, fair and more acceptable solution of the problem of the
child involved. 48

Dean Pound, speaking of such procedures, said:
Instead of being wholly contentious the proceeding in the [juvenile court] ...should be investigatory directed to determining the

best disposition or adjustment of the family situation as a whole
and seeking a complete disposition thereof. It may involve contentious trial of certain issues of fact. But the proceeding as a
whole should not be primarily and characteristically contentious.49
As has been amply demonstrated by personal juvenile court experience, this "judicial inquiry" type of hearing not only develops
more facts but also develops them more quickly and pleasantly than
does an adversary procedure. Certainly, ample proof of the fact
that children are not adjudged delinquent contrary to the weight of
the evidence is that there are no reported cases in Ohio nor are any
known in the United States where a delinquency judgment of the
juvenile court has been reversed on such grounds.
The absence of the rules of criminal procedure from a delinquency proceeding does not mean that there are no rules governing
such a proceeding or that the juvenile court judge is given a carte
blanche authority to improvise his own procedures. While juvenile
court acts rest on the theory that "the State is parens patriae rather
than prosecuting attorney and judge.., the admonition to function

in a parental relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness."" ° Unquestionably, "the customary rules of evidence shown
by long experience as essential to getting at the truth with reasonable certainty in civil trials must be adhered to. The findings of
fact must rest on the preponderance of evidence adduced under
those rules."51 The customary rules of evidence and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and its counterpart in most state constitutions require that the
right to confrontation of witnesses and cross-examination of adverse
481d. at 340-41, 153 NE.2d at 512.
Pound, The Place of the Family Court in the Judicial System, 10 CRIME & DE-

49

LwhxQUENCY 532, 542 (1964).
50 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966).
51

People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 178, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932).
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witnesses be accorded a child in a delinquency proceeding.5 2 Professor Wigmore has said that granting judges "the power to commit
to long detention any person without giving the person any opportunity to hear the substance of the testimony against him, is fundamentally unsound and practically dangerous."5
It is likewise true that a judgment in a delinquency proceeding
cannot be grounded on hearsay. "Hearsay, opinion, gossip, bias,
prejudice, trends of hostile neighborhood feelings, the hopes and
fears of social workers have no more place in Children's Courts than
in any other court."" It is true that by reason of the informality
of the juvenile court proceeding in which police officers and social
workers give "reports" instead of having their testimony elicited by
questioning, some of the evidence presented is dearly hearsay. But
it is also true that some hearsay testimony creeps into every case,
civil and criminal, under the most rigid rules governing adversary
proceedings. This is corrected, however, by the judge's admonishing the jury to disregard such testimony. When the court is the
trier of the facts, the judge sustains the objection and assures counsel that the objectionable hearsay will be disregarded and stricken
from the record. It is the writer's practice in juvenile proceedings
to state that everything in the reports given by policemen and social
workers which is not competent will be considered as would the
opening statement of counsel, that is, not as evidence but rather as
being what the witness expects the competent evidence to show,
and that any hearsay contained in the report is rejected unless it is
later supported by competent, sworn testimony. Unquestionably,
hearsay has no place in any juvenile court proceeding and there is
no reason to believe that juvenile court judges do not share the
legal profession's traditional attitude toward hearsay.
In the juvenile court's early eagerness to employ the behavioral
sciences, especially in social work, in the solution of its many human
problems, there was a marked tendency to allow the opinions of
clinicians to overly influence the court's judgments. One heard
such expressions as "trial by probation officer," "social workers run
52

In Bullard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), the following is
found:
The accused in such cases should be faced by witnesses who give evidence
against him and should be permitted to hear such evidence and have an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.... We are of the opinion, therefore,
that the trial court erred in considering statements of a material nature made
out of the presence and hearing of the appellants. Id. at 332.
5 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1400, at 145 (2d ed. 1940).
54 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 178, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932).
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the court" and "the decision was right socially but wrong legally."
With the court's development and maturation, the clinical reports
remain very necessary and important, but they now receive only the
consideration that the law permits. Accordingly, this writer asserted in a 1963 opinion:
As in no other Court, the judge in the Juvenile Court must take
under consideration the opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists and
social workers. But this is not to say that [these clinicians] ...are
charged with the responsibility of making the judges decision.
The distinction between the role of the judge and the clinician
must not be blurred. It is the clinician's job to make findings
and recommendations; it is the judge's job to make the decision
after careful consideration of the clinical reports and the [other]
evidence in the case.58
True, the court is required to act in the best interest of the child,
but this requirement applies only to the child who has been legally
determined to be within the court's jurisdiction. As was said in In re
Coyle:5 "Juvenile Court procedure has not been so far socialized
and individual rights so far diminished that a child may be taken
from its parents... simply because some court might think that to
58
be in the best interests of the state."
II.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Justice Fortas recently said that the theory of the juvenile
court is "rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in the
corpus juris."5 In this article an attempt has been made to show
that the juvenile court theory is rooted in the corpus juris, and deeply
so, and that it represents growth in legal theory rather than a departure therefrom. The problems of the juvenile court arise from
the failure of society to provide the necessary facilities and personnel
with which to achieve the aims of its social welfare philosophy
rather than from any shortcomings in the court's legal procedures.
As was said by Senator Estes Kefauver, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency: "There's nothing wrong with
the juvenile court idea, there's nothing wrong with the great majority of juvenile courts, that a little understanding, community sup55 In re Larry & Scott H., 192 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1963).
56 Id.at 687.
57
1n re Coyle, 122 Ind.App. 217, 101 N.E.2d 192 (1951).
58 Id, at 219, 101 N.E.2d at 193.
59
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
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port and proper staffing won't cure."6
It has been this writer's
experience that whenever a youthful law violator has been placed
in a facility where he would receive the care, control, and education
that he required, counsel and parents have expressed gratitude, with
no suggestion by the latter that their children had suffered a denial
of constitutional safeguards. As was also said by Senator Kefauver:
"[Tihere are few social problems to which the public has devoted
more hysterical wringing of hands and less intelligent thinking than
juvenile delinquency."'"
Perhaps society's glaring failure to provide the juvenile court
with necessary facilities is best demonstrated by noting that the
Ohio Youth Commission has a present existing need for residential
schools to accommodate four thousand children but has facilities
for only 1800 of these children."2
It is ironic that the juvenile court, after having withstood many
attacks which, of course, have contributed to its refinement and maturation, should now be inundated by criticism which arises from
recent criminal court cases involving the denial of constitutional
guarantees. This failure of the adversary system to recognize constitutional rights should not be permitted to vitiate the juvenile
court procedures which have developed over the centuries in the
recognition that children are not adults and that their problems
require procedures which are different from those designed for adult
criminals. With the necessary public support and with proper recognition by the bar and the law schools, the juvenile court can continue to pioneer in the field of individualized justice and to render
children the service for which it was designed.
60

Kefauver, The Juvenile Court System, in S.ELECED PAPeLS, 18TH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES 8 (1955).
61

Id. at 12.

62 The author derives this information from his experience during the last four

years as a member of the Youth Services Advisory Board of the Ohio Youth Commission.

